Curaçao is building something that larger jurisdictions have not yet attempted: a coordinated, island-wide quantum-safe position. SITG-Consulting is an Intelligence Sponsor of Curaçao Quantum Week 2026, running 3 to 10 November. The event is organised by the Curacao Quantum Safe Foundation, a coalition that includes the Ministry of Economic Development, the University of Curaçao and the Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten among its members. Why a small island state matte

SITG-Consulting’s BRICS-11 report finds no state at Tier 1 and examines why cryptographic capability, migration governance and cross-border interoperability must be treated separately.

On 15 September 2026, Malaysia's National Security Council (Majlis Keselamatan Negara), an agency of the Prime Minister's Department, confirmed Malaysia as the only ASEAN member state at Tier 1 for post-quantum cryptography migration readiness. The assessment behind that finding is SITG-Consulting's ASEAN Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness 2026: An Empirical Assessment of the ASEAN-10, published on 1 September. The statement and the report were reported by: Bernama, Malaysia

At the MY Digital Trust Summit 2026 in Kuala Lumpur, a speaker could not make the morning session. We were asked to fill fifteen minutes on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) for a non-specialist audience, at short notice. No slides. No preparation. Just a stand-up talk for three hundred people, from an ASEAN perspective, in plain English. We call it the backfill session. Watch the full talk Watch on YouTube: Post-Quantum Cryptography in Plain English — MY Digital Trust Summit 2

Expose what ASEAN member states can actually demonstrate about post quantum migration. Not what they intend. Not what they announce. What they can prove. SITG-Consulting has released ASEAN Post Quantum Cryptography Readiness 2026, published on Zenodo under CC BY 4.0: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22218529 The report assesses all ten ASEAN member states against the same locked five tier framework applied to the EU 27 and the United Kingdom. Evidence cut off: 17 August 2026. P

UK Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness: What the Evidence Actually Shows Every organisation holding data today with a shelf life beyond the next decade has a quantum problem, whether it has been named yet or not. Encrypted traffic intercepted now can be stored and decrypted later, once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. That risk, harvest now, decrypt later, is why post-quantum cryptography readiness has moved from a research topic to a governance question

The Netherlands sits in Tier 2 of SITG-Consulting’s Europe’s Post-Quantum Readiness 2026 assessment. That is an important distinction. The Netherlands has produced some of the strongest practical PQC migration guidance we found anywhere in Europe. But strong guidance is not the same thing as a governed national migration programme. Government Posture: Strong Guidance, No Binding Migration Programme The Dutch position is built around two important pieces of work. The PQC Migra

Lithuania stands apart in our assessment of post-quantum readiness across the EU-27. It is the only Member State to reach Tier 1, High Confidence. This does not mean Lithuania has completed its PQC migration. It means something more useful at this stage: the country has established publicly verifiable migration machinery, with governance, mandatory actions, implementation dates, inventory requirements and procurement provisions. Government Posture: From Awareness to Execution

SITG-Consulting has published Europe’s Post-Quantum Readiness 2026: An Empirical Assessment of the EU-27, an independent assessment of the publicly verifiable state of post-quantum cryptography readiness across all 27 European Union Member States. The research asks a question that is becoming increasingly important for governments, regulators, financial institutions, critical infrastructure operators and organisations operating across European borders: How ready is Europe to

SITG-Consulting went looking for something we expected to find. A continent-wide assessment of Africa’s preparedness for the transition to post-quantum cryptography. We could not find one. So the SITG-Consulting team conducted one. The result is Africa’s Post-Quantum Readiness 2026: A 54-Country Empirical Assessment, examining publicly verifiable evidence across every UN-recognised African sovereign state as at 3 August 2026. The headline number is difficult to ignore. 46 of

Norway’s digital ecosystem is one of the most mature and trusted in Europe. The country is now entering an early but serious quantum-transition phase. The government has begun developing a national quantum technology strategy for publication in 2026, supported by the Research Council of Norway, Innovation Norway and the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM). Investment is also increasing, including NOK 244 million awarded to four national quantum research centres. NSM’s

Cuba operates one of the most state‑controlled cybersecurity regimes in the Western Hemisphere. Its legal architecture is built on Decreto 360/2019, Decreto‑Ley 35/2021, and Resolution 105/2021, all of which focus on ICT security, cyberspace defence, telecom control, and mandatory incident reporting - none of which contain PQC migration, crypto‑agility, or quantum‑risk provisions. Government Posture: Strong Control, No Quantum Strategy Cuba’s cybersecurity model is centralise

The UAE is a high-maturity digital state with world-class infrastructure, aggressive AI adoption, and strong cybersecurity regulation. Recognizing its exposure as a global hub, the UAE moved decisively into action. In late November 2025, the UAE Cybersecurity Council approved the National Encryption Policy and Executive Regulation No. 71 of 2024, legally mandating Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) migration. Government Posture: Global Pioneer in Mandatory Migration The UAE's di

Mexico is in the developing stage of PQC adoption. The country faces elevated quantum risk due to classical cryptography across financial services, government systems, and telecom networks. Movement has begun through national cybersecurity reform and early PQC capability building, but Mexico still has no formal PQC migration roadmap. Government Posture: Cybersecurity Plan 2025–2030 Mexico’s Digital Transformation and Telecommunications Agency launched the National Cybersecur

Colombia is in the early stage of PQC adoption. The country faces elevated quantum risk due to heavy reliance on classical cryptography across financial services, government platforms, and telecom networks. Movement has begun through digital signature reform and initial alignment with NIST standards, but Colombia has no national PQC roadmap yet. Government Posture: Digital Signature Reform Colombia’s digital signature law, Law 527 of 1999, is being updated to include post qua

Japan is advancing PQC through national cryptographic modernization, semiconductor-rooted hardware security, and defense-aligned communication upgrades. It does not broadcast its quantum strategy loudly. However, it is one of the most structurally mature PQC environments in the world. This maturity stems from government standards, telecom backbone strength, and secure hardware ecosystems. Government Posture: CRYPTREC and MIC Modernization Japan’s cryptographic governance is a

Taiwan is advancing PQC through semiconductor security requirements, national defense modernization, and selective government upgrades. It does not publish loud quantum strategies, but it is quietly building one of the most security driven PQC environments in Asia due to geopolitical exposure and its central role in global chip supply chains. Government Posture: Security Driven PQC Adoption The Executive Yuan and National Science and Technology Council treat quantum risk as

🇧🇷 Brazil is entering the PQC transition through regulatory updates, federal digital signature modernization, and early quantum technology pilots. The country is not yet at the maturity of Singapore or India, but it has taken a decisive step by formally adopting NIST aligned PQC algorithms inside its national PKI. This marks Brazil’s shift from exploratory research toward structured national security uplift. Government Posture: ICP Brasil PQC Adoption Brazil issued ITI Nor

India is emerging as Asia’s most assertive sovereign adopter of Post Quantum Cryptography. Under the National Quantum Mission and MeitY’s PQC Task Force, the country is driving a three phase migration plan backed by domestic testing and procurement requirements. PQC has moved from research into a core element of digital sovereignty and critical infrastructure security. Government Posture: NQM Steering and Indigenous Sovereignty DST, MeitY, C DOT, CERT In, and DSCI lead a dua

Singapore is Asia's most operationally advanced PQC adopter. With a unified strategy, live quantum safe networks, and proactive regulators, PQC has moved from theory to structured deployment. Government Posture: Centralised & Risk-Based Leadership: Strategy led jointly by CSA, National Quantum Office, MAS, and IMDA. Standards: PQC is the primary migration path, aligned with NIST FIPS 203, 204, and 205. Core Milestones: End 2025: CII operators must complete full crypto invento