MAS has put dated quantum-safe migration expectations in front of Singapore's entire financial sector. The paper behind them carries no binding force, leaves its technical standard in a non-mandatory handbook and requires no independent assurance.

Singapore extends its quantum-safe timeline beyond CII. Germany publishes EU PQC roadmap guideline. Three IETF PQC drafts advance toward RFC publication.

On 15 September 2026, Malaysia's National Security Council (Majlis Keselamatan Negara), an agency of the Prime Minister's Department, confirmed Malaysia as the only ASEAN member state at Tier 1 for post-quantum cryptography migration readiness. The assessment behind that finding is SITG-Consulting's ASEAN Post-Quantum Cryptography Readiness 2026: An Empirical Assessment of the ASEAN-10, published on 1 September. The statement and the report were reported by: Bernama, Malaysia

At the MY Digital Trust Summit 2026 in Kuala Lumpur, a speaker could not make the morning session. We were asked to fill fifteen minutes on post-quantum cryptography (PQC) for a non-specialist audience, at short notice. No slides. No preparation. Just a stand-up talk for three hundred people, from an ASEAN perspective, in plain English. We call it the backfill session. Watch the full talk Watch on YouTube: Post-Quantum Cryptography in Plain English — MY Digital Trust Summit 2

Expose what ASEAN member states can actually demonstrate about post quantum migration. Not what they intend. Not what they announce. What they can prove. SITG-Consulting has released ASEAN Post Quantum Cryptography Readiness 2026, published on Zenodo under CC BY 4.0: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22218529 The report assesses all ten ASEAN member states against the same locked five tier framework applied to the EU 27 and the United Kingdom. Evidence cut off: 17 August 2026. P

Singapore has set the clock. It has not set the method. Singapore published two quantum-related documents on 16 July 2026: The Quantum-Safe Migration Handbook v1 The Quantum Readiness Index v1.0 The team at SITG-Consulting has reviewed both documents in detail. There is useful material here. The documents move the discussion beyond general awareness of quantum computing and towards organisational preparation, cryptographic discovery, governance, supplier engagement and migrat

Japan is advancing PQC through national cryptographic modernization, semiconductor-rooted hardware security, and defense-aligned communication upgrades. It does not broadcast its quantum strategy loudly. However, it is one of the most structurally mature PQC environments in the world. This maturity stems from government standards, telecom backbone strength, and secure hardware ecosystems. Government Posture: CRYPTREC and MIC Modernization Japan’s cryptographic governance is a

Taiwan is advancing PQC through semiconductor security requirements, national defense modernization, and selective government upgrades. It does not publish loud quantum strategies, but it is quietly building one of the most security driven PQC environments in Asia due to geopolitical exposure and its central role in global chip supply chains. Government Posture: Security Driven PQC Adoption The Executive Yuan and National Science and Technology Council treat quantum risk as

India is emerging as Asia’s most assertive sovereign adopter of Post Quantum Cryptography. Under the National Quantum Mission and MeitY’s PQC Task Force, the country is driving a three phase migration plan backed by domestic testing and procurement requirements. PQC has moved from research into a core element of digital sovereignty and critical infrastructure security. Government Posture: NQM Steering and Indigenous Sovereignty DST, MeitY, C DOT, CERT In, and DSCI lead a dua

Singapore is Asia's most operationally advanced PQC adopter. With a unified strategy, live quantum safe networks, and proactive regulators, PQC has moved from theory to structured deployment. Government Posture: Centralised & Risk-Based Leadership: Strategy led jointly by CSA, National Quantum Office, MAS, and IMDA. Standards: PQC is the primary migration path, aligned with NIST FIPS 203, 204, and 205. Core Milestones: End 2025: CII operators must complete full crypto invento

South Korea is a global semiconductor and technology powerhouse. It does not have a CNSA style, economy wide crypto retirement deadline, but it does have a government backed PQC Master Plan, sector wide pilots, and a national playbook aimed at transforming the country’s cryptographic infrastructure by 2035. Industry is still moving faster than regulation, but the state is not passive. Korea is building a phased and coordinated PQC transition. Government Posture: Master Plan a

New Zealand is the only Five Eyes member with no PQC retirement deadline. Conservative and advisory in posture, yet home to one of the globally significant contributors to ML‑DSA. This is NZ’s real PQC position. Government posture: NZISM v3.8 (Sept 2024), Section 2.4 requires agencies to inventory cryptographic assets, monitor GCSB updates, and prepare migration plans. No PQC algorithms are approved, and no deadline exists for retiring RSA, DH, ECDH or ECDSA. GSMA’s 2025 tra

Australia has moved from awareness to structured execution under the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) and Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) guidance. It is not the loudest, but it is the most disciplined in the Five Eyes on migration planning. 1. National Mandate: ASD and ACSC’s PQC Transition Framework The ACSC’s Planning for Post Quantum Cryptography guidance (2022–2025) sets a three stage LATICE based timeline: Refined transition plan by end 2026 Migration begun

Malaysia has quietly become ASEAN’s most assertive mover on quantum risk and PQC. Not the most advanced, not the most resourced, but the most coordinated, the most visible, and the first to publish a national PQC roadmap. This is why Malaysia now sits in the regional spotlight. 1. First in ASEAN with a National PQC Roadmap Malaysia is the only ASEAN member with a formal PQC transition roadmap. It is structured, time bounded, and aligned with NIST’s migration track. Core pilla

One supplier can destroy five years of post-quantum planning. Not through incompetence. Through dependency. The conversation around post-quantum cryptography still revolves around algorithms, migration plans and technical roadmaps. That misses the point. Modern organisations no longer control much of their own cryptography. It sits inside cloud platforms, software, managed services, operational technology and hardware supplied by third parties. Your programme cannot move fast

The Tipping Point: How Quantum Korea 2026 Exposes the Industry’s Reality and Its Fault Lines Quantum Korea 2026, held from July 2 to July 4 at DDP Art Hall in Seoul, is not just another conference on the international technology circuit. It is a geopolitical signal, a commercial barometer, and a diagnostic event that shows exactly where the quantum industry is advancing, where it is stalling, and where the rhetoric still exceeds the reality. Under the banner “Quantum in Actio

Japan just moved cybersecurity from guidance to gatekeeping. Over 1,000 government contractors are reportedly being pulled into stricter cybersecurity requirements aligned to internationally recognised standards such as NIST SP 800-171. This is not incremental. Japan is no longer treating cybersecurity as an internal technical issue. It is treating it as a condition of participation. For years, these controls were: best practice, maturity targets, aspirational governance. Now