An Analysis of ASD's PQC Vendor Approach.
- Brian Couzens
- Jul 16
- 1 min read
One supplier can destroy five years of post-quantum planning.
Not through incompetence.
Through dependency.
The conversation around post-quantum cryptography still revolves around algorithms, migration plans and technical roadmaps.
That misses the point.
Modern organisations no longer control much of their own cryptography. It sits inside cloud platforms, software, managed services, operational technology and hardware supplied by third parties.
Your programme cannot move faster than the least prepared supplier it depends upon.
Australia's ASD has just published a practical framework for evaluating vendor readiness. It is written for Australian organisations, but the underlying principles apply wherever organisations rely on external technology.
I have analysed the guidance and produced an executive briefing that goes beyond the checklist itself.
The publication isn't really about vendors.
It's about governance.
It asks a simple question that every board should already be asking.
What evidence exists that your critical suppliers can actually make the transition?
Because when the answer is, "They told us they could," you don't have assurance.
You have exposure.
Read the executive briefing here:
#PostQuantumCryptography #PQC #VendorRisk #SupplyChainSecurity #CyberGovernance #Cryptography #QuantumComputing #CyberSecurity #Procurement #ThirdPartyRisk




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