Why PKI Experts Should Not Lead PQC Transformation and the Real-World Risks
The fastest way to mishandle post-quantum cryptography is to treat it like a certificate refresh.
That is the trap. A public key infrastructure (PKI) team sees a cryptographic problem and reaches for a PKI answer: new certificate profiles, hybrid certificates, new roots, updated signing algorithms, fresh hardware security modules, and a neat migration plan around trust chains. Those things matter, but they are not the transformation.
Post-quantum cryptography, or PQC, is a whole-estate risk problem. It touches software, data, products, protocols, suppliers, contracts, embedded systems, archives, backups, identity, network design, operational technology, and customer-facing services. PKI is one part of that system, not its command centre.
That is why PKI experts and PKI firms must not lead PQC transformation, under any circumstances. They should contribute. They should be heard. They should own the areas where PKI is genuinely involved. A Senior Transformation Lead leads.
Giving PKI the lead role creates a narrow, certificate-centred programme that looks busy while missing the harder risks.

PKI solves a narrow part of the PQC problem
PKI manages digital certificates and the trust relationships behind them. It helps systems answer questions such as:
Is this server really the server it claims to be?
Was this software signed by a trusted signer?
Can this identity be trusted for this transaction?
That is useful and critical. A broken PKI can break authentication, signing, device identity, and encrypted sessions.
PQC asks a wider question.
What happens when widely used public-key cryptography becomes unsafe against a powerful enough quantum computer?
That question does not stop at certificates. It includes every place where vulnerable cryptography protects confidentiality, integrity, identity, or non-repudiation. It includes live traffic and old data. It includes systems that cannot be patched quickly. It includes products already shipped into the field. It includes partners that cannot tell you what they use. It includes data being collected today for decryption later.
National guidance describes the same scope. The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) sets out migration across the systems and services an organisation operates and the products it makes or uses, and asks organisations to record each data set's expected lifetime and its value to an adversary. It covers supply chains, dependencies on physical infrastructure, and the need to migrate long-lived hardware roots of trust. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) treats PKI as one of five affected areas, alongside network protocols, software cryptographic libraries, cryptographic hardware, and applications and services.
PKI specialists tend to focus on the parts they can see: certificates, certificate authorities, key lengths, certificate lifecycle tools, and signing systems. The exposure often hides elsewhere, such as:
Custom application code using an old crypto library
Virtual private networks (VPNs) and secure tunnels with fixed algorithms
Embedded devices with hard-coded cryptography
Payment, identity, and messaging systems with long retention periods
Firmware signing that will need to remain trustworthy for many years
Backup archives holding long-lived sensitive data, where vulnerable public-key cryptography protects the encryption keys or recovery mechanisms
Supplier products that disclose little about their crypto design
Much of it is shadow cryptography, the cryptography that discovery tools cannot see.
A PKI-led programme may improve the certificate estate while leaving the organisation's highest-value long-lived secrets exposed.
The risk is not only the future quantum computer
A common mistake is to frame PQC as a distant technical upgrade. That is too relaxed.
The risk already exists on two fronts. Attackers can collect encrypted traffic now, along with stolen archives whose keys are protected by vulnerable public-key cryptography, and hold them until decryption becomes possible. This is called harvest now, decrypt later. The exposure sits in the public-key cryptography that protects the keys. Well-sized symmetric encryption is not the target, and NIST does not expect to transition away from its symmetric standards as part of PQC migration.
Signatures face a different exposure. Any vulnerable public key that stays trusted is a target. Those public keys are already published, in certificates, software and firmware, so they can be harvested today. Once a capable quantum computer can recover the private key from one, attackers can forge signatures wherever that key is still accepted. This is called harvest now, forge later. Devices whose signature-verification code cannot be updated after manufacture, trust anchors built into hardware, and records that must stay authentic for years all need action before that capability arrives.
Both are reasons to act now, and neither outranks the other.
That changes the order of work. The first concern is not which certificate authority can issue a fashionable new certificate. The first concern is which data would still cause harm if exposed, and which signatures must still be trusted, in five, ten, or more years. That is the question Mosca's theorem forces.
On the confidentiality side, that might include:
National security information
Health records
Intellectual property
Legal material
Identity documents
Long-term commercial plans
Sensitive customer records
Authentication secrets and private keys
On the signature side, it might include:
Firmware and software signing keys
Code signing for products already in the field
Trust anchors built into devices and operating systems
Signed legal, financial, and regulatory records
Device identity in long-lived equipment
PKI supports important confidentiality and signature use cases. It does not cover the full set of cryptographic dependencies that protect either. Hybrid post-quantum key exchange in Transport Layer Security (TLS) shows the gap. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has published it as RFC 10024, Chrome has offered it by default since late 2024, and it protects session confidentiality without any change to the certificate. A certificate-led programme can miss that track entirely.
A risk-led PQC programme starts with the value and lifespan of the data and the signatures the business depends on. A PKI-led programme often starts with infrastructure inventory. Both matter, but the order changes the outcome.
If highly sensitive long-term data sits in an application with no external certificate change needed, a certificate-driven plan will not protect it. It may never even find it.
Certificate gimmicks create false comfort
The market already has a familiar pattern. A complex risk appears, vendors package it into something tidy, and leaders get offered an easy phrase: "PQC-ready".
For PKI firms, that means one of a few things:
Support for test certificates using post-quantum or hybrid algorithms
A discovery tool that finds certificates and grades them
A managed PKI roadmap with future algorithm updates
A new root hierarchy or certificate policy
A dashboard with red, amber, and green scores
Some of this can be useful. None of it proves the organisation is ready for PQC.
The gimmick is the pretence that PKI work equals PQC transformation. It is the same reason PQC vendors are not the starting point for a post-quantum transition.
A hybrid certificate does not fix a fragile application protocol. A crypto inventory tool does not rewrite a product. A new certificate policy does not shorten data retention. A vendor dashboard does not tell you whether an old medical device, industrial controller, mobile app, or third-party platform can handle new message sizes, new handshake patterns, or new failure modes.
Worse, these products can create the wrong story for senior risk committees. The board sees progress. The security team sees charts. Procurement sees a supplier with a credible slide deck. Yet the estate remains largely unmapped.
That is dangerous because false assurance is a risk multiplier. It slows hard decisions. It delays funding. It lets owners believe that someone else has handled the problem.
PQC migration will break things if it is treated as a PKI swap
PQC algorithms do not behave exactly like the algorithms they replace. Some keys and signatures are larger. Some protocols need careful design choices. Some systems will need memory, bandwidth, processing, firmware, or message-format changes. Compatibility and interoperability testing matters.
A certificate team can rotate certificates. It cannot safely redesign every protocol, product, and workflow that depends on cryptography.
PQC migration in production involves questions such as:
Can older clients handle larger certificates or signatures?
Will network appliances reject unfamiliar algorithms?
Can embedded devices store and process larger keys?
Do hardware security modules support the required algorithms in production-grade form?
Can mobile applications update fast enough across user devices?
Will regulated systems need recertification after cryptographic changes?
Can suppliers commit to timelines in contracts, not only marketing material?
What happens if a hybrid mode fails halfway through a transaction?
How will logs, monitoring, and incident response recognise PQC failures?
These are engineering, product, legal, operational, and risk questions. PKI expertise helps with some of them. It cannot carry them all.
A poorly led PQC programme can create outages, broken integrations, failed upgrades, and compliance gaps. In critical sectors, the damage reaches public services, payments, safety systems, and customer trust.
PKI experts have a conflict of framing
PKI experts are often highly capable. The issue is framing.
Every expert sees the world through the tools they use every day. PKI specialists are trained to think in terms of certificate chains, roots of trust, issuance, revocation, key custody, and lifecycle control. That framing is valuable. It is also incomplete.
A PKI firm also has a commercial reason to make the answer look like PKI work. If it sells managed PKI, certificate discovery, certificate automation, or signing services, it naturally defines the problem in a way that points back to those services.
Honest or not, that firm is unsuitable as the lead authority for the whole transformation.
PQC decisions need independent risk ownership. The lead must be able to say:
"This certificate work is useful, but it is not our top risk."
"This vendor claim does not cover our data exposure."
"This application must be redesigned, not given a new certificate."
"This supplier's answer is too vague for our risk register."
"This system should be retired rather than migrated."
A supplier whose business model depends on PKI delivery will struggle to make those calls without bias.
The governance failure occurs when a PKI delivery mandate becomes the enterprise transformation mandate. Certificate coverage then becomes a proxy for estate coverage, and supplier delivery metrics become a proxy for risk reduction.
The worst case: the PKI team takes the lead
Picture the worst case. The board hands PQC to the PKI team, or to the PKI firm it already pays. Nobody in that team sets out to fail. They default to their comfort zone: the tools they own, the inventory they can see, the vendors they buy from, and the deadlines they are measured on.
In year one, discovery becomes certificate discovery. The certificate lifecycle management (CLM) scan is declared the cryptographic inventory. Anything without a certificate drops out of sight: Secure Shell (SSH) keys, Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) tunnels, code and firmware signing outside the certificate authority, hardware security modules and key management, operational technology, long-retention data, and the cryptography inside third-party services. Priority follows the renewal calendar, not how long data must stay confidential or how long a signature must stay trusted.
In year two, the budget goes on CLM licences and a new post-quantum certificate authority hierarchy. The board receives a dashboard of certificates marked ready. The team is also fighting a fixed clock. In April 2025 the CA/Browser Forum, the body of certificate authorities and browser makers that sets baseline rules for public certificates, voted to cut the maximum validity of publicly trusted TLS server certificates from 398 days to 47 days, in stages from March 2026 to March 2029, a schedule that collides with post-quantum migration. The automation built to survive that schedule is relabelled as PQC progress. Automated renewal is reported as crypto-agility. It supports certificate lifecycle control. It does not show that the organisation can change algorithms across applications, protocols, products, and suppliers.
Suppliers, contracts, and procurement are never touched. Application owners, data owners, and product teams are never engaged, because the PKI team has no authority over them.
In year three, the organisation has a modern PKI. A regulator asks for the cryptographic inventory. The estate outside the certificate store is where it started, and the programme reports green because it measured only what it could see.

Risk teams need to reject the tidy sales story
The PQC plans that sound simple are the dangerous ones.
A simple plan might say:
Build a crypto inventory
Replace weak algorithms
Update certificates
Move to hybrid mode
Finish the migration when standards and vendors mature
That looks reasonable from a distance. In practice, each line hides serious work.
A crypto inventory is not only a scan of certificates, and discovery is not the same as the record it produces. It must include code, libraries, application programming interfaces (APIs), devices, data stores, key management systems, protocols, and supplier dependencies. It must separate what is known from what is assumed, which is the discipline set out in The Event Horizon II.
Replacing weak algorithms is not a single action. Some systems can change configuration. Others need new software. Some need hardware replacement. Some cannot change at all.
Hybrid mode is not a magic safety net. It can reduce risk when designed well, but it can also add complexity, increase message sizes, and create interoperability issues.
Vendor maturity is uneven. Some suppliers will be ready early. Others will use vague language for years. A risk team cannot accept "on the roadmap" as a control. That is why PQC is a procurement issue.
The warning here is against putting a narrow technical function in charge of a broad enterprise risk. PKI itself is not the target.
A Senior Transformation Lead must lead, in every case
PQC transformation must be led by a Senior Transformation Lead, in every case and without exception.
The Senior Transformation Lead answers to an executive sponsor with board-level authority. The natural sponsor is the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), though the role is not exclusive to the CRO. The lead needs authority, budget, and the mandate to challenge suppliers and internal teams and to overrule workstreams.
The programme the lead runs draws on:
Security architecture
Enterprise risk
Application and product owners
Data governance
Infrastructure and cloud teams
Procurement and supplier management
Legal and compliance
Operational technology teams where relevant
Cryptographers or external specialists with no product bias
PKI experts for the PKI workstream
PKI becomes one workstream among several. Certificate migration, code signing, device identity, and certificate authority readiness still matter. They just stop pretending to be the whole answer.
A better operating model has clear workstreams:
Data risk: identify data that must remain confidential, and signatures that must remain trusted, for many years.
Crypto inventory: map cryptographic use across applications, infrastructure, products, and suppliers.
Architecture: decide where algorithm agility, protocol changes, and redesign are needed.
PKI and signing: plan certificate, code-signing, and trust-chain changes.
Supplier assurance: put precise PQC requirements into contracts and assessments.
Testing: prove that new algorithms work under production traffic, failure, and recovery conditions.
Governance: track risk acceptance, funding, timelines, and residual exposure.
It is less neat than buying a PKI product, and more honest.
What the executive sponsor and risk committee should ask before approving a PQC plan
The executive sponsor and the risk committee do not need to be cryptographers. They do need to spot weak claims.
Before accepting a PQC proposal, ask plain questions:
What data and signatures are we protecting first, and why? If the answer starts with certificates rather than the value and lifespan of what is being protected, the plan is backwards.
Where do we use vulnerable public-key cryptography outside PKI? Look for applications, APIs, embedded devices, VPNs, messaging, backups, and third-party products.
Which systems cannot be changed quickly? These are often the highest-risk areas because they need budget, redesign, or replacement.
What supplier claims have been verified? Marketing phrases do not count. Ask for tested support, timelines, limitations, and contractual commitments.
How will we test compatibility and failure? A lab success is not enough. Production systems fail in messy ways, and deploying PQC is not the same as proving it works.
Who owns each residual exposure, and who is authorised to accept it? If no named person owns it, nobody does.
What is the plan now for long-lived confidential data and long-lived signatures? Waiting for perfect standards or perfect vendor support may leave both exposed.
These questions cut through gimmicks. They force the programme back to risk.
The counterargument, and why it fails
There is a counterargument: PKI teams already manage asymmetric cryptography at scale, so they are natural leaders for PQC.
That argument has some truth. PKI teams understand trust, keys, certificate lifecycles, revocation, signing, and automation. They have operational experience that many architecture teams lack. Ignoring them would be foolish.
But experience in one part of cryptography does not equal authority over all cryptographic risk.
A PKI team can lead the PKI workstream. It can define certificate policy. It can prepare issuing systems. It can advise on signing. It can monitor certificate authority and browser ecosystem changes. It can help prevent avoidable outages.
It must not decide enterprise-wide PQC priorities, approve supplier risk, classify long-lived data, redesign product protocols, or declare the organisation ready.
That distinction matters. Good governance puts PKI experts in the right seat, without sidelining them.
PQC readiness is boring, difficult, and necessary
PQC readiness will not look like a glossy dashboard with a green score. It will look like hard inventory work, uncomfortable supplier conversations, old systems being retired, data retention being challenged, test failures being fixed, and risk owners making funded decisions.
That is why gimmicks fail in practice. They promise a technical shortcut through a risk problem. They reduce a broad transformation to something that can be sold, installed, and reported.
PQC transformation needs discipline and a single accountable lead.
PKI experts must be part of the work, and they must not lead it. The lead must be a Senior Transformation Lead, answerable to an executive sponsor, who can see the full risk, challenge narrow answers, and make decisions across technology, data, suppliers, and operations.
Hand PQC to the PKI team and the organisation will look prepared while it stays exposed. That is the worst case, and it is avoidable.
Talk to the PQC transformation experts
SITG-Consulting is an independent PQC transformation advisory firm. We have no PKI to sell, no certificates to issue, no discovery tool and no product vendor partnerships. Our advice points at your risk and nowhere else.
We put governance in place before the scan, establish the as-is across the whole estate, and run transformation through mandatory governance gates, with PKI as one workstream among several.
Start with a PQC Discovery Sprint: a 20 to 30 day diagnostic that establishes cryptographic visibility, quantifies quantum exposure and delivers a defensible migration pathway.
Test the plan before the board funds it with an independent PQC Readiness Assessment.
Run the programme on the SITG Cryptographic Transformation Model: six levels, six mandatory governance gates and assurance beyond migration.
Prove the result with independent PQC assurance.
If a PKI team or a PKI firm holds the lead on your PQC programme today, move before the certificate plan becomes the transformation. Request a scoping call or write to brian.couzens@sitg-consulting.com.
About the author
Brian Couzens is CEO of SITG-Consulting, an independent advisory firm specialising in post-quantum transformation, cryptographic governance and assurance for financial services, critical infrastructure and government. Read more about SITG-Consulting or connect with Brian on LinkedIn.
Disclaimer
SITG-Consulting is a member of the PKI Consortium (PKIC), the not-for-profit consortium that brings together organisations committed to trustworthy digital identities and secure communication. We fully support its mission to advance trust in digital assets and communication through public key infrastructure, and its work on post-quantum readiness. This article does not criticise PKI, the PKI profession or the PKI Consortium. PKI is critical to post-quantum migration, and PKI expertise belongs inside any PQC programme. The argument is about who leads the transformation: that role belongs to a Senior Transformation Lead, with PKI as one of its workstreams.
Sources
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), Timelines for migration to post-quantum cryptography (March 2025): https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/pqc-migration-timelines
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NIST IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards (October 2026): https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2026/NIST.IR.8547.pdf
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), RFC 10024, Post-Quantum Traditional (PQ/T) Hybrid Key Agreement Mechanisms for TLS 1.3: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc10024
Google Chrome, post-quantum cryptography presentation to the CA/Browser Forum, Toronto (June 2025): https://cabforum.org/2025/06/10/2025-06-10-minutes-of-the-forum-toronto-f2f/Chrome_PQC_CABF_F2F_Toronto_2025_EXTERNAL.pdf
CA/Browser Forum, Ballot SC081v3: Introduce Schedule of Reducing Validity and Data Reuse Periods (April 2025): https://cabforum.org/2025/04/11/ballot-sc081v3-introduce-schedule-of-reducing-validity-and-data-reuse-periods/




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