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PQC Governance Digest: Cut-off 20 November 2026

Writer: Brian Couzens
Brian Couzens
8 minutes ago
8 min read
PQC Governance Digest world map highlighting the United States, UK, Germany and Denmark, cut-off 20 November 2026

Six signals this week: three from Europe, two global and one from North America. In our assessment the highest-consequence item is from the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) published joint effective practices on cyber risk relating to quantum computing, saying there is "a strong case for firms to start" addressing quantum-related cyber risks.

In the same week, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) published a final report on quantum computing and financial markets, a member of the Bundesbank Executive Board illustrated a 14-year harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure window with a worked example, and the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that the revision of its Transport Layer Security (TLS) guidelines is expected to add support for post-quantum algorithms.

Null this week (no qualifying signal identified): India and South Asia, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Africa and Middle East.

🇬🇧 UK Financial Regulators Publish Joint Effective Practices on Quantum Computing Risk

Theme: Supervisory publication | Financial services | Public-key cryptography

The Detail

On 19 November 2026 the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA published "Effective practices: Cyber risk and resilience management relating to quantum computing". The same day they issued a joint consultation on cyber risk and resilience management (PRA CP17/26, FCA GC26/9), which closes on 26 February 2027; the effective practices are not part of that consultation.

The effective practices say that a sufficiently capable quantum computer "could undermine the public-key cryptography widely used to protect financial transactions", and that "there is a strong case for firms to start to address quantum-related cyber risks". Boards and senior management "need to consider the implications of quantum computing" for their firm's cyber risk and resilience, and the practices described include "agreeing a documented migration plan with clear milestones and dates". The regulators state that the effective practices are "not part of the regulators' formal expectations".

Why it matters: The three UK authorities have together set out what they regard as effective practice on quantum risk: board and senior management attention, and a documented migration plan with milestones and dates. The practices are not part of their formal expectations and are intended to be used proportionately; in our reading, that leaves each firm to judge how far its programme matches them, and an independent post-quantum cryptography readiness assessment is one way to make that judgement on evidence.

🌐 IOSCO Publishes Final Report on the Implications of Quantum Computing on Financial Markets

Theme: Multilateral report | Securities markets | Migration readiness

The Detail

IOSCO published its Final Report on the Implications of Quantum Computing on Financial Markets (FR/07/26) on 19 November 2026. It draws on a March 2026 survey of members of IOSCO's Board-level Fintech Task Force, roundtables held in 2025 and 2026 in Tokyo, New York, Zurich and Mumbai, and a literature review.

The report says IOSCO members' survey responses and stakeholder engagement "suggest that preparedness across the financial sector remains at an early stage". The majority of observed activity is concentrated on awareness-raising, governance development, training, identifying inventories of cryptographic assets at risk and preliminary migration planning, while more advanced work, including migration testing, validation and implementation, remains limited. The report states that authorities and market participants "should not wait for the emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers before beginning preparedness and migration planning". It notes that migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) "may be particularly challenging for blockchain systems". It flags the risk of "quantum washing", where institutions may overstate the role, maturity or performance of quantum computing use cases, and records that some participants in its stakeholder engagement described a tendency towards "quantum-procrastination": recognising the need to prepare but deferring action.

Why it matters: IOSCO's stated position is that authorities and market participants should not wait for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer before preparing, set against its own evidence that migration testing, validation and implementation remain limited.

🇩🇪 Bundesbank Board Member Illustrates a 14-Year Harvest-Now-Decrypt-Later Exposure Window

Theme: Central bank speech | Harvest-now-decrypt-later | Crypto-agility | Board governance

The Detail

Michael Theurer, the member of the Deutsche Bundesbank Executive Board responsible for financial supervision and financial stability, opened the TechDay at Euro Finance Week in Frankfurt with a keynote on 18 November 2026. The speech, "Innovation braucht Resilienz: KI und Quantencomputing im Finanzsektor" (Innovation needs resilience: artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing in the financial sector), is published in German.

Theurer described the harvest-now-decrypt-later risk: data intercepted and stored today could be decrypted later. He illustrated a 14-year exposure window using Mosca's inequality and a hypothetical credit bank. In his example, data must remain confidential for 20 years and a five-year migration ends in 2031; if a quantum computer were available in 2037, data encrypted between 2017 and 2031 would be exposed from 2037 to 2051.

He defined crypto-agility as the ability to replace cryptographic methods quickly when needed without endangering core business processes, and said institutions should know which encryption methods they use, where critical dependencies lie and which data needs long-term protection. In a broader point on AI and quantum computing, he said the board must understand which technologies are used, what dependencies arise and what risks follow. He called on financial institutions to take up the topic promptly and with high priority.

Why it matters: The Bundesbank's Executive Board member for financial supervision has said, in specific terms, what institutions should know about their own cryptography. In our reading, that amounts to a cryptographic inventory.

🇺🇸 NIST to Revise Its TLS Guidelines, with Post-Quantum Support Among the Expected Changes

Theme: Federal guidance | Transport Layer Security | Standards revision

The Detail

NIST announced on 19 November 2026 that it will revise Special Publication (SP) 800-52 Rev. 2, "Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations". The revision "is also expected to address" a list of items, among them adding support for post-quantum algorithms, aligning with the TLS 1.3 specification in Request for Comments (RFC) 9846, and raising the minimum bits of security to 128.

NIST also plans that the new revision will recommend that servers "may" support, rather than "should" support, TLS 1.2, and will not generally allow support for TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1. The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) "will define a timeline after which cryptographic modules must have a strong justification in order to include TLS 1.2 in general and an exceptional justification in order to include TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1 in non-governmental servers".

Why it matters: SP 800-52 is NIST's guidance on configuring TLS, and post-quantum support is now on its list of expected changes; separately, NIST says the CMVP will define a timeline for cryptographic modules that include TLS 1.2, TLS 1.0 or TLS 1.1. No draft has been released, so the post-quantum provisions are not yet known.

🇩🇰 Denmark Launches Projekt Kvantesikker with Two New Guidance Documents

Theme: National programme | Threat assessment | Migration guidance

The Detail

Denmark's Styrelsen for Samfundssikkerhed (SAMSIK) and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste, FE) launched Projekt Kvantesikker in cooperation with Alexandra Instituttet on 17 November 2026. The project is based on the website kvantesikker.dk, and two new guidance documents were published at the same time.

FE assesses it likely that quantum computers capable of breaking classical cryptography could become a reality as early as 2030 to 2035. The announcement says the transition to quantum-safe cryptography is extensive and could take several years, that organisations need, among other things, to map where and how they use cryptography and plan the migration, and that it is therefore important to begin the work now. SAMSIK will also give proactive advice, based on the guidance, to companies and authorities in critical infrastructure.

Why it matters: Denmark has paired a defence intelligence threat estimate with published guidance and an advisory channel for critical infrastructure. In our reading, a migration of several years set against an earliest estimate of 2030 leaves Danish companies and authorities little margin, which makes migration planning a current task.

🌐 IETF Constrained Devices PQC Draft Reaches RFC Editor Queue

Theme: Informational guidance | Constrained devices | Key-storage hardware

The Detail

The Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) approved "Adapting Constrained Devices for Post-Quantum Cryptography" (draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-hsm-constrained-12), from the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (PQUIP) working group, on 19 November 2026, and the document entered the RFC Editor Queue the same day. It remains an Internet-Draft, with intended status Informational.

The draft provides guidance on integrating post-quantum cryptography into resource-constrained devices, such as dedicated key-storage hardware and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. It covers hardware security, seed-based key generation, ephemeral keys, offloading of cryptographic tasks and the effect on firmware updates.

Primary source: IETF Datatracker

Why it matters: For organisations with large estates of IoT devices or constrained cryptographic modules, where migration meets fixed limits on processing, memory and power and depends on secure firmware updates, this approved but unpublished guidance is worth following.

Global Sweep

Region

In-window signals

Status

Global

IOSCO final report; IETF constrained devices draft approved

2 signals

North America

NIST to revise SP 800-52 TLS guidelines

1 signal

Europe

UK joint effective practices; Bundesbank speech; Denmark Projekt Kvantesikker

3 signals

India and South Asia

None identified

Null

Asia-Pacific

None identified

Null

Latin America

None identified

Null

Africa and Middle East

None identified

Null

Borderline items, not promoted: a Payment Card Industry (PCI) Security Standards Council blog post on preparing for post-quantum cryptography (17 November); two Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) drafts on the security considerations of the Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM) and FrodoKEM (18 November); four individual Internet-Drafts not adopted by a working group (15 to 19 November); and a Korea Internet and Security Agency (KISA) notice, posted on 17 November, of its 2026 Future Cryptography Workshop.

SITG-Consulting Comment

Three sources, one week, the same direction of travel: the UK regulators' effective practices, IOSCO's final report and the Bundesbank keynote are different kinds of act, and none of them sets a new rule.

IOSCO reports activity concentrated on awareness, governance, inventory and preliminary planning, with testing and implementation limited. The UK practices point boards to a documented migration plan with milestones and dates. Theurer said institutions should know which encryption methods they use, where critical dependencies lie and which data needs long-term protection.

Beyond financial services, Denmark's defence intelligence service assesses it likely that quantum computers capable of breaking classical cryptography could arrive as early as 2030 to 2035, and NIST expects to add post-quantum support to its TLS guidelines.

Our view: these publications show quantum risk to cryptography being treated as a supervisory matter for financial services, and delay is a mistake. The question for any board is whether its programme has moved past awareness and planning into testing and implementation.

What Was NOT Missed

North America: the White House, Office of Management and Budget, National Security Agency, US Treasury, Federal Reserve and Bank of Canada.

India and South Asia: the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team, Reserve Bank of India and Bangladesh Bank.

Asia-Pacific: the Cyber Security Agency of Singapore, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Japan, Korea Internet and Security Agency and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority.

Latin America: Banco Central do Brasil, Banco Central de la República Argentina and Chile's Comisión para el Mercado Financiero.

Africa and Middle East: the Central Bank of Kenya, Bank Al-Maghrib, African Union and Saudi National Cybersecurity Authority.

Central bank speeches: 14 in the window opened and searched; one qualified.

Press and trade outlets were swept for leads only; nothing here rests on press coverage.

Blocked or unrendered at source this week and covered by dated search only, among others: the UK National Cyber Security Centre news page, Germany's Federal Office for Information Security, the Federal Register, the Saudi Central Bank and the Central Bank of Egypt.

Forward Watch: 21 to 27 November 2026

KISA Future Cryptography Workshop, 24 November 2026 (4 days). KISA's Next-Generation Cryptography Technology Team hosts presentations of 2026 national cryptography competition papers and a session on recent cryptography trends.

Later dates: the UK consultation on cyber risk and resilience management (PRA CP17/26, FCA GC26/9) closes on 26 February 2027 (98 days).




Disclaimer: This digest is published by SITG-Consulting for informational purposes. It does not constitute legal, regulatory or technical advice. Primary sources are cited for publication and policy claims. Regional scan results reflect SITG-Consulting's own research window and accessible sources. Readers should verify applicability to their jurisdiction and circumstances.




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