Brian C Founder & CEO, SITG-Consulting | Thought Leader & Forensic Strategist Quantum Risk, PQC, ERM, Compliance & Governance | Independent Validation | Board Advisor | Author | Quantum Risk Management 3 August 2026 This week's structural signal was verification, not capability. Anthropic stated its AI model broke a NIST post-quantum signature candidate that had survived two full rounds of accredited human expert review; the algorithm's own developers confirmed the finding an

27 July 2026 This week the confirmed signal set was dominated by state and quasi-state actors building coordination infrastructure rather than by vendors announcing capability. Israel opened a funded tender for national quantum R&D infrastructure, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre convened its first joint government-industry PQC migration workshop, and Japan's government-backed research agency launched a fiscal-year-scheduled silicon quantum manufacturing programme. In

Brian C Founder & CEO, SITG-Consulting | Thought Leader & Forensic Strategist Quantum Risk, PQC, ERM, Compliance & Governance | Independent Validation | Board Advisor | Author | Quantum Risk Management July 20, 2026 This week the ecosystem moved from announcement to institutionalisation across three separate layers: standards, manufacturing and procurement. A code-based post-quantum algorithm reached ISO standardisation, giving the PQC landscape a second formal standards trac

#PQC and #Data: The Three #Cryptographic Domains Post-quantum risk is about the data being protected, not the algorithms themselves. Every cryptographic dependency maps to one of three data states. If you do not know which state you are protecting, you do not know what you are securing. #Data in #Motion Information moving across networks or channels. TLS sessions, VPN tunnels, 5G key agreement, SWIFT messages, API calls. Quantum relevance: interception and harvest. If the con

The disclosure of 73,932 compromised Fortinet firewall URLs is not just another VPN incident. It is a cryptographic governance failure at global scale and a perfect illustration of why organisations must treat HNDL (Harvest Now, Decrypt Later) and HNFL (Harvest Now, Forge Later) as present-tense operational risks rather than abstract quantum-era hypotheticals. The incident was empirically documented by Volodymyr "Bob" Diachenko, who discovered the attacker-controlled server c